The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act in Pennsylvania by Iobst, C. Richard
Volume 35 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 35, 
1930-1931 
1-1-1931 
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act in Pennsylvania 
C. Richard Iobst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
C. R. Iobst, The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act in Pennsylvania, 35 DICK. L. REV. 84 (1931). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol35/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
IN PENNSYLVANIA
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act has been in
effect in Pennsylvania since 1923.1 However, due to the
necessities of Pennsylvania practice, the courts resorted to
the declaratory judgment in many fields long before the
act was passed, although the judgment rendered was not
called by that name. Judgments rendered in suits against
the Commonwealth are in effect declaratory judgments,
since no executory process followed as of course in such
cases, and the distinctive characteristic of a declaratory
judgment is that the declaration stands by itself.' Likewise
a judgment in an equitable proceeding to remove a cloud
from the title to real estate, where no consequential relief
is granted, is in effect a declaratory judgment, as is one
rendered in a case stated t6 pass on the marketability of
the title to real estate.
Jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act will
not be assumed in a particular case unless the court is satis-
fied that an existing controversy, or the ripening seeds of
one, exists between the parties.2 By "existing controversy"
is meant a controversy regarding the law relating to an
existing fact or set of facts., In the case of Reese v. Adam-
son,5 a petition for a declaratory judgment was presented
by the poor directors of a certain county, against the county
controller, county treasurer, and county commissioners, set-
ting forth that the plaintiffs were uncertain as to their
rights and duties, and praying that the court declare them
under certain statutes as to the levy and collection of taxes.
The pleadings failed to show that a real controversy existed
or was anticipated with anyone as to said rights and duties,
so the court held that it was not a proper case for declara-
tory relief. As a matter of fact, all that the petition asked
for was a mere advisory opinion. If a set of facts had
'Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840.
2Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455 (1925).
3Kariher's Petition, supra.
,'Brewer v. Brasted, 11 Pa. D. & C. 103 (1928).
5297 Pa. 13 (1929).
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existed which would have indicated that the plaintiffs had
been or would be interfered with in the discharge of their
duty owing to a conflict between the statutes involved, the
court intimates that it would be a proper case for the
rendition of a declaratory judgment.
A declaratory judgment will not be granted merely to
decide moot or imaginary cases that do not exist in fact.
This is illustrated in Bell Telephone Co. v. Lansdowne
Borough,6 where the Telephone Company petitioned for a
declaratory judgment to test the validity of a zoning
ordinance, but failed to allege that it contemplated the
present acquisition of land in the restricted district for a
use prohibited by the ordinances, nor did it aver the prob-
ability that it would be necessary in the near future for it
to acquire land therein for such purpose, and the court
dismissed the petition, since the necessary controversial
elements were lacking. It seemed that the petitioner's
chief fear was that sometime it might desire to purchase
land and erect a business building in the area upon which
the ordinance placed zoning restrictions.
Courts will not render declaratory judgments if there
is another statutory remedy available which has been
specially provided for the particular type of case. Demp-
sey's Estate,7 illustrates this rule. In that case there was a
citation upon an executor to show cause why he should
not file an account. He answered denying management of
the estate or possession of assets, and then petitioned for
a declaratory judgment to have determined to what extent,
if any, he was obliged to account. The court dismissed
the petition, holding that the relief sought would be as
speedily and effectively obtained under the proceedings al-
ready pending. In another case,' there was a petition for
a declaratory judgment to annul a marriage on the ground
that one of the parties was married to a third person at
the time of the performance of the ceremony. The petition
was refused, since the statutory remedy under the act
618 Dela. Co. Repts. 307 (1927).
7288 Pa. 458 (1927).
gShallenberger v. Shallenberger, 8 Pa. D. & C. 235 (1926).
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of Apr. 14, 1859,9 is available to annul bigamous marriages,
the procedure being the same as in cases of divorce.
As to the practice in declaratory judgment cases, the
petition must be presented to a court of record, 0 and the
way to determine in which court the petition is to be pre-
sented is by using the following test: If the particular
court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the parties
independent of the act, a declaratory judgment could be
rendered, that is to say, provided the other requisites are
present. If the particular court did not have jurisdiction
independent of the act, it will not get jurisdiction by reason
of the act." The same precision and formality should
be observed in the petition asking for a declaratory judg-
ment as in the pleadings in other cases, and the petitioner
must be one who would have standing to be a party if the
action were in one of the usual forms." The case of
Rockwood & Co. v. Pusey,13 is interesting because it is an
odd one. An action of replevin was brought, and there was
a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of
defense. The defendant then sought to use the affidavit of
defense as a petition for a declaratory judgment, but the
court refused so to use it, saying that the act con-
templates a distinct proceeding by petition, and not the
grafting of an application for a declaratory judgment on a
pending action at law.
Acceptance or rejection of jurisdiction may depend
largely upon the manner in which the facts are shaped
and pleaded, to the end that a real issue shall be presented
for decision. Thus, in a great many instances, the situation
is largely in the hands of counsel. The case of Carter et al.,
School Directors v. Blakely Borough School District,1" illus-
trates how the facts could be shaped to get a case before
OP. L. 647.
101923 P. L. 840, Sec. 1.
"Additional Law Judge, 53rd Judicial Dist., 10 Pa. D. & C. 577
(1927); Frederick's Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C. 591 (1927).
"2Additional Law Judge, 53rd judicial Dist., supra.
1395 Pa. Super. Ct. 129 (1928).
1429 Lackawanna Jurist 91.
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the court so that a declaratory judgment would be rendered.
In the above case the School District of the Borough re-
ceived authority from the voters of the district for a bond
issue to erect and equip a new school building and put an
addition to another building. The members of the School
Board petitioned the court for a declaratory judgment, the
petition stating that the petitioners considered it advisable
and desired to erect a gymnasium, and asked the court to
decide whether the erection of the gymnasium was within
the purpose approved by the voters, and if so, that the court
enter a judgment authorizing them to so spend the remain-
ing money. The court dismissed the petition, saying that
a judgment rendered would be merely an advisory opinion,
since the school directors would not be bound thereby to
erect a gymnasium, but could change their mind about
doing so. A proper case for a declaratory judgment could
have been created with little difficulty. All that was neces-
sary was a resolution of the board of directors to erect the
gymnasium, an appropriation of money for preliminary
plans, and a notice from the treasurer or other interested
party, denying the authority of the board so to act. This
would have created an issue within the scope of declaratory
judgment procedure.
The main purpose of the act is to provide a convenient
method of determining the disputed interests of parties
under statutes, ordinances, deeds, wills, and written con-
tracts. 5 The act has been used to construe leases;'6 to
obtain construction of wills;I7 to construe statutes and
ordinances;18 to construe a deed of trust;19 to decide the
15Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 268 (1928); Wagner v. County of
Somerset, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 434 (1929).
' 6Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507 (1928);
Spector v. Bonwit Teller Co., 10 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1928); Dattolo v.
Stevenson, 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 588 (1928).
17Kariher's Petition, supra; Brown's Estate, 289 Pa. 101 (1927);
Morris v. Morris, 13 Pa. D. & C. 634 (1930); Kidd's Estate, 293 Pa.
21 (1928); Paine's Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C. 629 (1930).
l8Cupp Grocery Co. v. Johnstown, 288 Pa. 43 (1927); Brookville's
Election, 5 Pa. D. & C. 54 (1924); Taylor v. Haverford Twp., 299
Pa. 402 (1930).
19Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 1i (1925).
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effect of building restrictions in deeds ;20 to construe in-
demnity contracts ;21 to construe an ordinary deed.2 2 In the
case of Fox, District Attorney v. Ross, 23 the act was made use
of by one appointed district attorney by the Board of
judges to fill a vacancy, to have the length of the term for
which he was appointed judicially determined, and also to
determine whether the appointment was legally made. In
Sterret's Petition,2 the act was used to declare the rights,
status, and duties of a sheriff in relation to the enforcement
of law under an executive order of the President of the
United States. In another case, the court refused to use
the act to determine the extent of an injunction in regard
to contemplated acts, saying that the declaratory judg-
ments act is not to be used to modify or elucidate a decree
of court.2 5 Whether the Supreme Court will use the act
to annul a marriage is still an open question, since no such
case has yet gone up to our highest court. However there
is a Superior Court case and a County Court case upon this
point. In the case of McCalmont v. McCalmont,2' the
paramour of a woman divorced for adultery in Pennsylvania
petitioned for a declaratory judgment. He married her in
Maryland during the lifetime of her former husband, and
both parties were residents of Pennsylvania. The act of
Mar. 13, 1815,27 forbade such a marriage. But the court
refused the petition on two grounds: First, that there was
another method available for the speedy determination of
the issue involved, and second, that it is a matter of
judicial discretion whether or not jurisdiction will be taken
of a particular case. As a matter of fact, there was no
20Garvin & Co. v. Lancaster County, 290 Pa. 448 (1927); In re
Plastic Club, 7 Pa. D. & C. 50 (1925); Hoffman's Petition, 7 Pa. D.
& C. 88 (1925); O'Neil v. Lex, 9 Pa. D. & C. 149 (1927).
2lMalley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216 (1929).
22Equitable Gas Co. v. Smith, 13 Pa. D. & C. 616 (1930).
237 Pa. D. & C. 263 (1926).
249 Pa. D. & C. 430 (1926).
25Ladner v. Siegel, supra.
293 Pa. Super. Ct. 203 (1928).
276 Sm. L. 286, See. 9.
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other remedy available, 2 but the court was right as far
as the second ground is concerned. 9 Since the only reason
the petition was refused is because the court used its
judicial discretion, the case cannot be cited as authority for
the proposition that the declaratory judgments act will
not be used to annul a marriage, in a proper case. In the
case of Duchi v. Duchi, 0 the court rendered a declaratory
judgment declaring null and void a purporting marriage
between first cousins. There was no other remedy avail-
able, and the court did well to clear up the undesirable
status of being a party to a void or voidable marriage.
If a proper case comes before our Supreme Court it can
make real use of the declaratory judgments act in annuling
purporting marriages.
Before the court will entertain a petition, the parties
must all be before the court.3' In addition to the persons in
interest being made formally parties to the proceeding, they
must be notified that they have been made parties or that
they shall appear and defend, otherwise the judgment
rendered will not be res judicata. 2 Thus there is no denial
of due process. 3 The declaration may be either affirmative
or negative in form and effect, and has the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree.3 4 Under section six of the
act, the court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment
where it would not terminate the controversy or uncertain-
ty giving rise to the proceedings. Section seven provides
for an appeal as in other cases, and section nine provides
for the right to a jury trial if the facts are in dispute.
Courts view the act with favor, as is evidenced by a
remark made by the court in the case of Girard Trust Co. v.
Tremblay Motor Co., supra, to the effect that the parties
could have avoided certain difficulties if they had sought a
2SSeibert v. Seibert, 3 Pa. D. & C. 142.
2 9Brewer v. Brasted, supra.
30l1 Pa. D. & C. 610 (1928).
3 'Schoen's Petition, 6 Pa. D. & C. 256 (1924).
2 Carter et al, School Directors, v. Blakely Borough School Dist-
rict, supra.
"3 Additional Law Judge, 53rd Juticial District, supra.
"'1923, P. L. 840, Sec. 1.
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declaratory judgment at an earlier stage of their dealings.
In another case,35 the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice
Moschzisker, said that the declaratory judgments act is an
excellent piece of legislation when kept within proper
bounds. To summarize, a declaratory judgment will not be
granted: 1. When the court is asked to decide moot or
imaginary cases that do not exist in fact. 36 2. When a mere
advisory opinion is asked for, to which the answer would
not be binding, and the judgment rendered would not be
res judicata2' 3. Where the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or the parties.3 8 4. Where there is an-
other statutory remedy available which has been specially
provided for the particular type of case. 9 5. Where the
court is asked to pass upon future rights in anticipation of
an event that may not happen, unless special circumstances
warrant an immediate decision and all parties appear in
court."0
C. Richard Iobst
LIABILITY OF DRAWER ON FORGED ENDORSE-
MENTS OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
As a general rule,1 the drawer-depositor, upon showing
a forged endorsement on his check, is permitted to recover
the amount paid thereon by the drawee-bank. The reason
for this rule is that there is a contract implied from the
relation of the parties and from general business custom,
between the bank and its depositor, to the effect that the
former is to pay the latter's check to. the person designated
85 Taylor v. Haverford Township, supra.
36Bell Telephone Co. v. Lansdowne Borough, supra.
37Carter et al., School Directors v. Blakely Borough School Dist-
rict, supra.
3SAdditional Law Judge, 53rd Judicial District, supra.
3 9Shallenberger v. Shallenberger, supra.
40,Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co., 298 Pa. 182
(1929).
'Cf. 52 A. L. R. 1297; 22 A. .L R. 1228.
